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Abstract—The Internet of Things (IoT) is experiencing explo-
sive growth and has gained extensive attention from academia
and industry in recent years. Most of the existing IoT infras-
tructures are centralized, in which the presence of a cloud server
is mandatory. However, centralized frameworks suffer from the
issues of unscalability and single-point-of-failure. Consequently,
decentralized IoT has been proposed by taking advantage of
the emerging technology of Blockchain. Voting systems are
widely adopted in IoT, such as a leader election in wireless
sensor networks. Self-tallying voting systems are alternatives
to traditional centralized voting systems in decentralized IoT
since the traditional ones are not suitable for such scenarios.
Unfortunately, self-tallying voting systems inherently suffer from
fairness issues, such as adaptive and abortive issues caused by
malicious voters. In this paper, we introduce a framework of self-
tallying systems in decentralized IoT based on Blockchain. We
propose a concrete construction and prove the proposed system
satisfies all the security requirements including fairness, dispute-
freeness and maximal ballot secrecy. The implementations on
mobile phones demonstrate the practicability of our system.
Keywords: E-voting, Self-tallying, IoT, Blockchain, Zero-
knowledge proof.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) [1]- [9] is a system comprising
smart devices, actuators, sensors and other objects that con-
nected through the network with the ability to transfer data,
share resources and make decisions without man-to-man or
man-to-device interaction. Organizations in various industries
utilize IoT for better efficiency, convenience and service 1.
Besides the well-known applications of smart city and smart
home, IoT has potential in many other public and private ap-
plications, such as manufacturing, agriculture, transportation,
and healthcare. In recent years, IoT gains extensive attention
and some new extensions of IoT are proposed, such as IIoT
and NB-IoT. The number of devices is in an explosive growth.
It is estimated that there will be 50 billion IoT devices by the
year of 2020 [10].
Voting systems and IoT. Voting systems have wide appli-
cations in IoT. We list two typical examples here. 1) Leader
election in distributed IoT. Leader election is one of the most
1https://internetofthingsagenda.techtarget.com/definition/Internet-of-
Things-IoT
common and important activities in a distributed IoT, such as
wireless sensor networks [11]. The goal of leader election is to
designate a special node as an organizer to coordinate the tasks
in distributed nodes to break the inner symmetry in distributed
systems. The peers in the network select and communicate
among themselves to vote for the leader. 2) Decision making
in IoT systems. One of the most salient features of IoT systems
is to collect data and make smarter decisions according to
the sensed data. Voting is one of the effective approaches
making decisions 2. Devices measure various types of data
and leverage diverse methods to analyze the data, which
may lead to a different opinion to a specific decision. Then
devices vote for a final decision. Take an environmental health
IoT as an example, which comprises some smart phones
with apps to acquire the environmental parameters with high
accuracy including temperature, humidity, noise, and dust. All
the parameters are closely related to people’s health. Thus,
the environmental health IoT is an important reference for
healthcare. The smart devices collaborate to make decisions
in an environmental health IoT to show whether the current
environment is suitable to live or work in.
Nevertheless, most of the IoT implementations are with a
centralized infrastructure. Specifically, the devices are linked
with the cloud and controlled by a central hub, which suffers
from scalability, efficiency and single-point-of-failure issues.
To overcome the bottleneck of centralized IoT, the notion
of decentralized IoT was proposed [13]. The devices enjoy
the desirable merits of peer-to-peer (P2P) communication,
flexibility and better efficiency to exchange information. A
majority of decentralized IoT leverages Blockchain [12] to
build the underlying P2P network. A San Francisco based
startup Helium 3 has built a blockchain machine network for
IoT. 4
Traditional voting systems with a central party to organize
the vote and tally the ballots are not suitable for a decentralized
IoT framework. As an alternative, self-tallying scheme was
2http://healthandlearning.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Decision-
Making-Models-Voting-versus-Consensus.pdf
3https://www.helium.com/
4https://internetofbusiness.com/helium-blockchain-machine-network-iot-
unleashed/
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proposed, which does not require a third party to tally the
ballots and reveal the final result. Instead, after all the voters
cast the ballots, anyone can collect the ballots and compute the
final results at the same time. However, self-tallying schemes
inherently suffer from fairness issues, as the last voter can
collect other voters’ ballots to compute the final result before
casting his/her own ballots. That is he can know the result
ahead of schedule. Moreover, if he is not satisfied with the
final result, this voter may refuse to reveal his ballot, then
other voters are hard to obtain the final result.
A. Our Contributions
In this paper, we aim to improve the fairness of blockchain-
based self-tallying systems for decentralized IoT. The contri-
butions of this article are listed as follows.
1) We formalize the system model of self-tallying voting
systems based on blockchain in decentralized IoT.
2) We propose a concrete construction of a blockchain-
based self-tallying voting protocol in decentralized IoT,
and prove it satisfies fairness, dispute-freeness and max-
imal ballot secrecy. Specifically, in our construction, we
modify the commitment in [15] and recovery phase in
[19] to handle the abortive issues, and suggest that timed
commitment can be used to deal with adaptive issues
self-tallying voting schemes based on blockchain.
3) We implement the proposed protocol on a laptop and a
mobile phone respectively.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
We review the related work and provide some preliminaries
in Sec. II and Sec. III, respectively. The security requirements
are presented in Sec. IV. We build a fair blockchain-based
self-tallying voting system for decentralized IoT in Sec. V.
The implementations of the proposed protocol are illustrated
in Sec. VII. Finally, we conclude the paper in Sec. VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
Self-tallying e-voting. E-voting is a flourishing and fadeless
topic in academic research. In traditional centralized e-voting
protocols, a central authority is usually involved for organizing
the election and counting the votes. To achieve stronger voter
privacy, Kiayias and Yung [18] proposed the notion of self-
tallying voting, which is a new paradigm in decentralized e-
voting systems. In self-tallying systems, tallying is an open
procedure in which any party, not only the voters but also
the observers, can check the validity of each ballot and
perform the computation after collecting all the valid ballots
to get the final voting result. They proposed the first concrete
construction as well by leveraging a bulletin board, which
achieves perfect ballot privacy and dispute-freeness. Groth et
al. [17] proposed a simpler scheme with better efficiency for
each voter. They also constructed an anonymous broadcast
channel with perfect message secrecy at the cost of increased
round complexity of the protocol, which needs n + 1 rounds
for n voters. Hao et al. [16] proposed a self-tallying voting
protocol based on a two-round anonymous veto protocol (AV-
net). Their protocol provides the same security properties
but achieves better efficiency in terms of round complexity.
Khader et al. [19] claimed that [16] is neither robust nor fair,
and they advanced the protocol by adding a commitment phase
and a recovery round. However, the recovery phase in their
construction ignores the ballots of the abortive voters.
Blockchain-based e-voting systems. There are already some
existing works on e-voting based on blockchain. The role
of blockchain in e-voting protocols varies from schemes to
schemes. Most of the works make blockchain as bulletin
boards and still employ a trusted authority for voter privacy,
such as Follow My Vote 5, TIVI 6 7. Some of the existing
works are based on cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin [20]
[21]. Takabatake et al. [31] proposed a voting protocol based
on Zerocoin to enhance voter privacy. In 2017, McCorry et al.
[15] presented Open Vote Network 8 9, the first implementation
of a decentralized self-tallying e-voting protocol based on
Blockchain. The commitment in [15] is the hash of the vote,
which is irrecoverable if a voters refuses to cast his ballot in
the voting phase.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we provide some preliminaries used in our
construction.
A. Intractable Assumptions
1) Discrete Logarithm (DL) Assumption.
Let λ be a security parameter and G =< g > denotes a
cyclic group of prime order p. DL problem [30] is that, given
a tuple (g, ga) ∈ G and output a ∈ Zp, where Zp is the set of
non-negative integers smaller than p. DL assumption holds if
for any polynomial-time algorithm A, the following advantage
AdvDLA is negligible in λ.
AdvDLA (λ) = Pr
[
A(g, ga)→ a
]
2) Decisional Diffie-Hellmam (DDH) Assumption
Let λ be a security parameter and G =< g > denotes
a cycle group of prime order p. DDH problem [30] states
that given a tuple (g, ga, gb, g(1−x)ab+xc) ∈ G and output
x ∈ {0, 1}. DDH assumption holds if for any polynomial-time
algorithm C, the following advantage AdvDDHC (λ) is negligible
in λ.
AdvDDHC (λ) =
∣∣∣Pr[C(g, ga, gb, gab) =1]−Pr[C(g, ga, gb, gc) =1]∣∣∣
B. ElGamal encryption
ElGamal encryption [27] is semantically secure under the DDH
assumption. Another merit of ElGamal encryption is its inherent ho-
momorphism. The ciphertexts of m0,m1 can be easily aggregated to
obtain the ciphertext of m0m1. A distributed ElGamal cryptosystem
5https://followmyvote.com/
6 https://tivi.io/
7http://www.smartmatic.com/fileadmin/user upload/Whitepaper Online
Voting Challenge Considerations TIVI.pdf
8https://github.com/stonecoldpat/anonymousvoting
9https://ethereumfoundation.org/devcon3/sessions/the-open-vote-network-
decentralised-internet-voting-as-a-smart-contract/
[28] is a generalization of ElGamal encryption, which contains the
following algorithms.
Setup. Suppose there are n users in the system, and the key pairs
of the i-th user are (xi, yi = gxi). Each user publishes his public
key, and the common public key can be generated in a distributed
manner [29] as y =
n∏
i=1
yi.
Enc. To encrypt a message m, randomly choose r, and compute
a ciphertext (c1, c2) of m as (gr, yr · gm).
Dec. Each user computes and broadcasts the partial decryption
key cxi1 . Then the decryption can be done by computing
gm = c2/
n∏
i=1
c1
xi = c2/c1
x1+···+xn
.
C. Commitment
A commitment scheme allows a user to commit to a selected
statement, which is hidden to others during the Commit phase, but
can be revealed by the user in the Open phase. A commitment scheme
contains the following two properties:
• Binding. The committer cannot change the statement after he
has committed to the statement.
• Hiding. The receiver knows nothing about the committed state-
ment before the committer opens the commitment.
D. Zero-Knowledge Proof of knowledge and Σ-Protocol
Let R = (x,w) be a binary relation, where x is the common
input and w is a witness. A zero-knowledge proof of knowledge is
a protocol in which a prover P proves to a verifier V that it knows
a witness w for which (x,w) ∈ R without revealing anything.
A Σ-Protocol is a way to obtain efficient zero-knowledge proof.
A protocol is a Σ-Protocol for relation R if it has 3-move as shown
in Fig 1. 1) P sends a message a to V . 2) V sends a random t-bit
challenge e to P . 3) P sends a response r, and V decides to accept
or reject based on the verification algorithm.
Prover Verifier
(random SP ) ( random SV )
((v, w) ∈ R) (v ∈ LR )
a = α(v, w, SP )
a−−−−−−−−−→
e←−−−−−−−−− e = γ(SV )
r = ρ(v, w, e, SP )
r−−−−−−−−−→
φ(v, a, e, r)
Fig. 1. Σ Protocol
A Σ-protocol has the following properties.
• Completeness. If P and V follow the protocol on input x and
w, where (x,w) ∈ R, the verifier always accepts the prover’s
proof.
• Special soundness. For any x and any accepting conversations
on x with the same message a and different challenges (a, e, r)
and (a, e′, r′), where e 6= e′, one can efficiently extract w such
that (x,w) ∈ R.
• Honest verifier zero-knowledge(HVZK). There is a polynomial-
time simulator, which on input x and a challenge e outputs an
accepting conversation with the form (a, e, r), with the same
probability distribution as conversations between the honest P
and V on input x.
The special soundness property implies that the error probability
of this proof system is always 2−t.
Now we show a special case of the definition above by Schnorr to
prove a DL relation (Fig. 2) [34]. Let G be a group of order q with
a generator g. P and V have common inputs (g, q, h ∈ G), P has a
private input w such that gw = h.
Prover Verifier
(g, q, h, w ) ( g, q, h )
α ∈R Zq
a = gα
a−−−−−−−−−→
e←−−−−−−−−− e ∈R Zq
r = α− we
r−−−−−−−−−→
a = grhe
Fig. 2. Σ protocol for a DL tuple
Σ-Protocol is efficient to prove AND, OR and arbitrary combina-
tion of AND/OR statement. More details can be found in [32] [33]
[26].
IV. SYSTEM AND SECURITY MODEL
In this section, we propose the system model of blockchain-based
self-tallying voting system for decentralized IoT and list the necessary
security requirements and security model of a self-tallying voting
protocol.
A. System model
The framework of a blockchain-based self-tallying voting protocol
for decentralized IoT system is shown in Fig. 3. There are three
roles in the sytem, smart devices, gateway and a blockchain. The IoT
system is equipped with many smart devices, which are regarded as
voting devices. A blockchain is leveraged to achieve a P2P overlay
network and can also fulfill device management [14] and a bulletin
board. Each device needs to register when they first enroll in the
system and cast the ballots through gateway to blockahin. After
collecting the ballots from the blockchain, the results can be obtained
immediately to make decisions for the whole IoT system.
B. System components
A blockchain-based self-tallying voting system in a decentralized
IoT consists of the following algorithms. Suppose there are n voting
devices in the system denoted as voter Vi.
Setup((k, n)→ (ski, pki)). This is a probabilistic algorithm that
takes a security parameter k and the number of voters n as input and
outputs the private and public key pair (ski, pki) for each voter Vi.
Commit((vi, {pkj}(j 6=i)) → Ci). This algorithm is run by each
voter Vi. On input a vote vi and other voter Vj’s public key
{pkj}(j 6=i), it outputs a commitment Ci and a corresponding zero-
knowledge proof, and publishes Ci and the proof on the blockchain.
Vote((vi, ski, {pkj}(j 6=i)) → Vi). This algorithm is run by each
voter Vi. On input a vote vi, the private key ski, and the other voter
Vj’s public key {pkj}(j 6= i), it outputs a ballot Vi and a zero-
knowledge proof to prove the ballot is in the right form, and publishes
Vi and the proof on the blockchain.
Gateway
Gateway
Devices & Sensors
Block Block BlockBlockGenesis
Blockchain
Regist Vote
Block
Voting devices
Fig. 3. The framework of blockchain-based self-tallying voting system in a
decentralized IoT
Tally({Vi}(i∈n) → Result). This is a deterministic algorithm that
takes all the ballots {Vi}(i ∈ n) as input, it outputs the election result.
Recover(({ski}(i∈n), Ci)→ vi). This algorithm is to recover the
abortive voter’s vote. On input the abortive voter’s commitment Ci
and all the other voters’ private key {skj}(j 6=i), it outputs the abortive
voter’s vote vi.
C. Security requirements
A self-tallying protocol is supposed to satisfy the following secu-
rity requirements.
• Maximal ballot secrecy. A partial tally of the ballots can be
accessed only by a collusion of all remaining voters.
• Self-tallying. After all the voters cast their ballots, anyone is
able to compute the voting results with all the ballots.
• Fairness. Freeness means that nobody has the priority to
get a partial tally ahead of schedule. Self-tallying protocols
always suffer from fairness issues, including abortive issues and
adaptive issues. Abortive issues indicate that some of the users
refuse to reveal their votes and abort before casting their ballots,
then the final results won’t be revealed. Adaptive issues state
that the last voter has the priority to get the final results first
and thus may affect his choice and even gives up in this vote,
thus will cause an abortive issue.
• Dispute-freeness. This property states that anybody can check
whether the voters follow the protocol or not. This is an
extension of universal verifiability.
D. Security model
In this section, we formalize the security model for maximal ballot
secrecy.
Suppose there are maximal n− 2 corrupted voters in the maximal
ballot secrecy game, who are fully controlled by the adversary. The
adversary can make queries to the commitments as well as the
corrupted users’ ballots, and also get access to the final result of
the election. And later in the challenge phase, given two ballots from
different votes {0, 1} for the two uncorrupted voter, the adversary
needs to tell which of the two ballots is from the vote 1. The detailed
security model is as follows.
Maximal ballot secrecy (MBS): We say a self-tallying voting
scheme is MBS-secure, if no polynomial bounded adversary A has
a non-negligible advantage against a challenger C in the following
game.
Initial. There are n voters in the game. A declares two target
voters Vs, Vt to be challenged upon. The other voters are regarded as
corrupted users. C randomly chooses one from {Vs, Vt} and denotes
as v∗. Set the vote of V
∗
as 1, and the other one as 0.
Setup. C generates the private and public key pairs for each voter.
Then C forwards all the public keys and the corrupted users’ private
keys to A.
Queries. A can choose any ballots for the corrupted users and
make some queries including the Commit queries and the Vote queries
corresponding to the chosen ballots.
• Commit queries. A can query the commitment for a vote. Then
C generates the commitment and records the ballot and the
commitment in the list LC .
• Vote queries. A can make queries on the votes generated by
any user other than Vs, Vt.
Challenge. C outputs two challenge ballots on behalf of the
uncorrupted voters Vs and Vt chosen in the Initial phase.
Tally. A can compute the final result of the election according to
the collected ballots.
Guess. A outputs a guess guess to determine which one between
Vs and Vt has cast the ballot of 1.
In the above model, the reason we set two challenge votes rather
than one is to prevent the adversary deducing the challenged vote
from his known information. Specifically, as the adversary can control
the ballot of the corrupted voters and will obtain the election result
after collecting the challenge vote, if there is only one challenge vote,
the adversary can have a non-negligible advantage in the guessing
game. After collecting the votes together, the adversary can do the
tallying by itself to know the election result. To see why we set
the different ballots for the two challenge votes, let’s suppose the
following situation. If we set the challenge vote with the same ballot
from {0, 1}, and all the corrupted voters controlled by the adversary
vote the same ballot, then the adversary can get the knowledge about
the challenge vote easily after knowing the results, in which the
advantage  is non-negligible.
Definition 1. The voting scheme is MBS secure if for any
polynomial time adversary,
|Pr[guess = V ∗]− 1/2| ≤ ,
where  is negligible.
V. CONSTRUCTION
In this section, we present a concrete construction of self-tallying
voting system with the help of blockchain. As shown in Fig. 4, the
system contains three phases, the Pre-vote phase, which includes
Setup and Commit algorithms, Vote phase, which includes Vote
algorithm, and After-vote phase, which includes Tally and Recover
algorithms. In the Pre-vote phase, the system is initialized and the
voters register to obtain the private-public key pairs. Voters put
their public keys together with the zero-knowledge proof for the
corresponding private keys on the blockchain. Commit is to ensure
fairness. If voters skip commit part and cast their ballots directly,
the last voter has the priority to access the final result ahead of
schedule. In this phase, other voters cannot see the vote but only
the commitment of the vote, thus, the voters need a zero-knowledge
proof to prove the committed vote is in the right form. Later if the last
voter refuses to vote, other voters can recover the ballot according to
the commitment and get the result. In Vote phase, the voters cast their
encrypted ballots. In After-vote phase, by collecting all the ballots
from the blockchain, the final result can be obtained publicly by
anyone. Recover is an optional phase which can be called when the
last voter does not follow the rule to cast his/her ballot in the sense
that the ballot can be recovered with the corresponding commitment
and the help of all the other voters.
Gateway
Devices & Sensors
Block Block BlockBlockGenesis
Blockchain
Block
Setup
Pk, proof
Commit Vote
Block Block BlockBlockGenesis
Blockchain
Block
Result
Block
Tally Recover
vote
vote
vote
vote
vote
vote
Fig. 4. The workflow of blockchain-based self-tallying voting system.
A. Dealing with abortive issues
Basic idea. The existing approaches to deal with abortive issue
are adding a recovery phase, in which the abortive users are excluded
by removing their ballots, and tally the ballots from the remaining
voters. However, an abort may be caused by some user knowing the
unwanted result and against revealing the result. So, simply removing
the votes will bring a different voting result. Thus, we modified the
recovery phase in [15]. In our modification, if the last voter quits after
making a commitment, then his/her ballot can be revealed according
to the corresponding commitment with the cooperation of all the other
voters. The detailed construction is as follows.
Setup((k, n)→ (xi, yi)). On input a security parameter k, and the
number of voters n, it initializes the system. Each voter Vi chooses
a random private key xi ∈ Z∗q , and computes the public key gxi .
Then Vi generates a zero-knowledge proof as ZKPoK1{(xi) : yi =
gxi}(cf. Fig. 5). The public key and the corresponding ZKP are
published to Blockchain.
Prover Verifier
w ∈R Zq
a = gw
a−−−−−−−−−→
e←−−−−−−−−− e ∈R Zq
r = w − xie
r−−−−−−−−−→
a = gryi
e
Fig. 5. Zero-knowledge proof for Setup
Commit(vi, {yj} → Ci). Before casting a ballot, each voter
Vi collects the other voters’ public key yj(j 6=i). To generate a
commitment to the vote, Vi chooses a random ρi and publishes
βi = g
ρi . Vi makes the commitment Ci = gviYiρi to ensure
fairness, where vi is the vote from {0,1} and Yi = ∏nj=1,j 6=i yj .
The voters also need to generate a zero-knowledge proof to prove
that the commitment is in the right form (cf. Fig. 6) as
ZKPoK2{(ρi) : (Ci = Yiρi ∨ Ci = g · Yiρi) ∧ βi = gρi}.
And then put the commitment and zero-knowledge proof on the
Blockchain.
Vote(vi, xi, {yj} → Vi). To ensure the secrecy of the vote,
all voters encrypted their votes as Vi = hixigvi , where hi =
∏i−1
j=1 g
xj/
∏n
j=i+1 g
xj . And generate a zero-knowledge proof to
prove that the vote vi is the same as the one in the commitment.
The statement (cf. Fig. 7) is
ZKPoK3{(xi, ρi) : (Ci = Yiρi∧Vi = hixi ∧ yi = gxi∧βi = gρi)
∨(Ci = g · Yiρi ∧ Vi = g · hixi ∧ yi = gxi ∧ βi = gρi)}.
Then publish the ballot on the Blockchin.
Tally({Vi} → result). To tally the votes, one can collect all the
ballots and compute
∏n
i=1 hi
xigvi = g
∑n
i=1 vi .
∑n
i=1 vi is a small
set that can be easily obtained.
Recover((Ci, {xi}) → vi). If the last voter Vi does not cast his
ballot in Vote phase, then each of the remaining voters Vj(1 ≤ j ≤
n, j 6= i) publish a recover factor for Vi as Rij = yjρi = βixj
together with a zero-knowledge proof to prove that it is in the
right form (cf. Fig. 5). The value of gvi can be computed as
gvi = Ci/
∏n
j=1,j 6=i yj
ρi . Then the value of vi is easy to get as
there are only two candidates.
To compute the final result of the election, each remaining voter
Vj publishes hˆj
xj , where hˆj =
∏n
k=j+1,k 6=i yj/
∏j−1
k=1,k 6=i yj and a
ZKPoK to prove the knowledge of xj as in Fig. 5. Now everyone
can compute the result of the remaining voters as g
∑
j 6=i vj =∏
j 6=i hˆj
xj
Vj . So the final result of this election is
∑
j 6=i vj + vi.
We note that the proofs in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 are three-move
interactive protocols with the techniques in [32], which can be
transformed into non-interactive protocols following Fiat-Shamir’s
heuristics [22] by setting e be a hash value of a secure hash function.
B. Dealing with adaptive issues
The adaptive issues seem inevitable in self-tallying protocols from
its definition because the last voter holding the ballot has the priority
to access the final results ahead of the other voters. We suggest
to use time-locked primitives [35] [36] to deal with the adaptive
issues in voting systems. Time-lock encryption allows users to get
the results only after a certain time [23] [24]. Once the deadline is
past, the decryption can be performed immediately. It is stated in
[23] that time-locked encryption can be achieved by using a witness
encryption with Blockchain as the computational reference clock. We
borrow this idea in our proposed scheme by encrypting the vote with
a witness encryption and the witness can be produced by Blockchain
after certain time. And the blockchain can also be the computational
reference clock to measure the “certain” time, say after generating
several blocks. Then the votes can be decrypted once the deadline is
past and thus all the voters and observers can do the tallying to get
the result simultaneously.
VI. SECURITY PROOF
In this section, we show the proposed protocol satisfies all the
security requirements presented in Sec. IV.
Firstly, we show the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge in Fig. 5,
Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 satisfy completeness, special soundness [32], [33]
and honest verifier zero-knowledge (HVZK). We show the detailed
proof of Fig. 6 and omit the proofs for other Figures, as the proofs
are quite similar.
Theorem 1. The proof in Fig. 6 satisfies completeness, special
soundness and honest verifier zero-knowledge.
Proof. We omit the proof for completeness as it’s straightforward
to verify.
The witness for the statement in ZKP2 is ρi. To prove special
soundness, the goal is to extract a witness from the three-move
interaction with two accepting conversations in polynomial time.
Given the two accepting conversations with the same values in the
first round, different random numbers in the second round and dif-
ferent responses in the third round as (a1, a2, b1, b2, e, e1, e2, r1, r2)
and (a1, a2, b1, b2, e, e′1, e′2, r′1, r′2), it can be checked easily that
Prover Verifier
vi = 1 vi = 0
w, e1, r1 ∈R Zq w, e2, r2 ∈R Zq
a1 = Yi
r1Ci
e1 a1 = Yi
w
b1 = g
r1βi
e1 b1 = g
w
a2 = Yi
w a2 = Yi
r2(Ci/g)
e2
b2 = g
w b2 = g
r2βi
e2
a1,a2,b1,b2−−−−−−−−−→
e←−−−−−−−−− e ∈R Zq
e2 = e− e1 e1 = e− e2
r2 = w − ρie2 r1 = w − ρie1
e1,e2,r1,r2−−−−−−−−−→
e = e1 + e2
a1 = Yi
r1Ci
e1
a2 = Yi
r2(Ci/g)
e2
b1 = g
r1βi
e1
b2 = g
r2βi
e2
Fig. 6. Zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for Commit
Prover Verifier
vi = 1 vi = 0
w, γ, e1, r1, r2 ∈R Zq w, γ, e2, r3, r4 ∈R Zq
a1 = Yi
r2Ci
e1 a1 = Yi
γ
b1 = hi
r1Vi
e1 b1 = hi
w
c1 = g
r1yi
e1 c2 = g
w
d1 = g
r2βi
e1 d2 = g
γ
a2 = Yi
γ a2 = Yi
r4(Ci/g)
e2
b2 = hi
w b2 = hi
r3(Vi/g)
e2
c2 = g
w c2 = g
r3yi
e2
d2 = g
γ d2 = g
r4βi
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Fig. 7. Zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for Vote
one of the following holds ρ′i = (r1 − r′1)/(e1 − e′1) or ρ′i =
(r2 − r′2)/(e2 − e′2).
To prove HVZK, there exists a simulator S, who is
given a random e, it randomly chooses r1, r2, e1, e2, where
e = e1 + e2, and computes the conversation as (Yir1Cie1 ,
Yi
r2Ci/g
e2 , gr1βi
e1 , gr2βi
e2 , e, , e1, e2, r1, r2), which is an accept-
ing conversation. It is indistinguishable from the one generated by
the honest prover.
Next, we prove the proposed scheme is MBS secure if ZKPoK is
zero-knowledge and the DDH assumption holds.
Theorem 2. If there exists an adversary that can win the guess
game in MBS security model with a non-negligible advantage, then
we can build an algorithm B that can break the zero-knowledge of
the ZKPoK and the DDH problem.
Proof. Suppose there are n voters V1, · · · , Vn in the game. The
challenger C can interact with the adversary A. We list a sequence of
games [37] to prove Theorem 2. We denote Pr[Wini] as the winning
probability of an adversary (guessing correctly) in Gamei.
Game 0: This is the original Game defined in section IV-D. A
chooses two target voters Vs, Vt to challenge upon and forwards them
to C. C tosses a coin to decide that one of the voters from {Vs, Vt}
votes 1 and the other one votes 0. The reason that we do in this way is
to let A knows nothing even from the tally result. The one who votes
1 is denoted by V
∗
. The challenges are denoted as {C∗s , pi∗s , V ∗s }
and {C∗t , pi∗t , V ∗t }, where C∗k is the commitment of the vote, pi∗k
represents all the ZKPoK in the scheme, V ∗k is the ballot, k ∈ {s, t}.
The adversary outputs a guess guess, then from the definition of the
MBS game, we have
Pr[Win0] = Pr[guess = V
∗
].
Game 1. Game 1 is the same as Game 0 with one difference.
C runs a simulator S as in Theorem 1., and replaces all the zero-
knowledge proofs (pi∗s , pi∗t ) with the simulated proofs (pi, pi′) without
using the real witness. The setting is indistinguishable from A’s view.
If A can distinguish between the two settings in Game 0 and Game
1 with a non-negligible advantage, then we can use the adversary
to construct an algorithm B to violate Zero-Knowledge of ZKPoK.
Thus, the adversary’s winning probability in Game 1 satisfies the
following equation.
|Pr[Win1]− Pr[Win0]| ≤ ZK
Game 2. Game 2 is the same as Game 1 with one difference.
C replaces the commitment C∗s with a random number Cs. The two
settings are indistinguishable from A’s view. Specifically, C generates
private and public key pairs for the voters other than {Vs, Vt}. Then
set the public key for Vt as ga, βs as gb, R ∈ {gab, gr}, where r is a
random number. C sets C′s = gvsR·(gb)
∑n
i=1,i 6=s,t xi Clearly, if there
is a difference in the adversary’s winning probability between Game
1 and Game 2, we can use the adversary to construct an algorithm B
to violate DDH problem. Thus, the adversary’s winning probability
in Game 2 satisfies the following equation.
|Pr[Win2]− Pr[Win1]| ≤ DDH
Game 3. Game 3 is the same as Game 2 with one difference. C
replaces the commitment C∗t with some random number C′t. Follow
the same analysis as in the previous game, C sets the public key of
Vs as ga, βt as gb, R ∈ {gab, gr}, where r is a random number.
C sets C′t = gvtR · (gb)
∑n
i=1,i 6=s,t xi . If there is a difference in
the adversary’s winning probability between Game 2 and Game
3, we can use the adversary to construct an algorithm B to violate
DDH problem. Thus, the adversary’s winning probability in Game
3 satisfies the following equation.
|Pr[Win3]− Pr[Win2]| ≤ DDH
Game 4. Game 4 is the same as Game 3 with one difference. C
changes the values of V ∗s , V ∗t with two random elements V ′s and V ′t
satisfying certain relation. The change is indistinguishable from A’s
view under the DDH assumption. Wlog, we assume s < t. Given the
DDH instance (A = ga, B = gb, C) where C ∈ {gab, gr}, C sets
the public key of Vt and Vs as A = ga and B = gb respectively. C
computes V ′s and V ′t as
V ′s = g
vsA′/C, V ′t = g
vtB′C
where
A′ = A
∑s−1
j=1 xj−
∑t−1
j=s+1 xj−
∑n
j=t+1 xj ,
B′ = B
∑s−1
j=1 xj+
∑t−1
j=s+1 xj−
∑n
j=t+1 xj .
Thus, V ′s and V ′t are two random elements satisfying V ′s =
gA′B′/V ′t . Clearly, if there is a non-negligible difference in the
adversary’s winning probability between Game 3 and Game 4,
we can use the adversary to construct an algorithm B to solve
DDH problem. Thus, the adversary’s winning probability in Game
4 satisfies the following equation.
|Pr[Win4]− Pr[Win3]| ≤ DDH
Wrapping up. The winning probability for A in Game 4 to output
a correct guess is 1/2 because in this game the challenges contain
only random numbers, which are independent of the votes vs, vt.
Therefore, we can conclude that there is only a negligible difference
in winning probability for an adversary between Game 0 and Game
4, if all the ZKPoKs in the scheme are zero-knowledge and DDH
assumption holds. So the probability for A in winning the MBS game
is 1
2
+ , where  = ZK + 3DDH .
Now, we show the scheme satisfies fairness, self tallying and
dispute freeness as well.
Fairness. Suppose voter Vi votes for vi in the Commit phase and
refuse to provide the vote in the Vote phase. Due to the Soundness
of ZKPoK, we can guarantee that vi is decryptable by other voters
in the Recover phase.
Self-tallying. The zero-knowledge proof of knowledge in each
algorithm in the proposed protocol forces the voters to perform
honestly according to the protocol. After all the voter cast the ballots,
the self-tallying property is easy to verify. As
∏n
i=1 hi
xi = 0 in Tally
algorithm, thus the self-tallying property is achieved.
Dispute freeness. For dispute freeness, again the zero-knowledge
proof of knowledge in each algorithm of the proposed protocol forces
the commitments and ballots are in the right form and also can be
publicly verified by anyone.
VII. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we report the implementation results of the pro-
posed construction.
In our experiment, we first implement the protocols on a laptop.
For a better simulation of IoT devices, we then implement the
protocols on a mobile phone, which has constrained resources. The
running environment of the laptop is with Win 8 64-bit operating
system and Intel Core (TM) i5-4300 @2.49GHz CPU with an 8 GB
SSD. And the configuration of the phone is Android 7.1.1 operating
system with Qualcomm MSSM8998 @2.45 CPU (Octa-core) and a
6 GB RAM. The projects are written in C++ language with Miracl
library [38] under Visual Studio 2010 and Android Studio compiler
respectively. We test the efficiency of each algorithm when the
number of voters increases. The implementation results are illustrated
as follows.
As we can see from both figures (Fig 8,9) that the running time
of each algorithm grows almost linearly with the increase of the
number of voters and the two figures have the same trend. Among
the four algorithms, the most expensive one is Vote, as ZKPoK3 is
the most complicated one among all the zero-knowledge proofs and
it is dominant in Vote. The running time of Vote for 3 voters and
12 voters on laptop and phone is 5.01 ms, 12.264 ms and 21.03 ms,
49.794 ms respectively. The fastest algorithm is Tally, which is also
consistent with our empirical analysis, as no zero-knowledge proof
is needed and the equation to tally the votes is the product of the
voters’ ballot, which is linear with the number of voters. The running
time of Tally for 3 voters and 12 voters on laptop and phone is 2.02
ms, 4.076 ms and 9.52 ms, 21.714 ms respectively. For the other
two algorithms, Commit and Recover, they grow linearly with the
increase of the number of voters, as the computation in these two
algorithms requires all the other users’ information. Thus, the more
voters in the system, the more computation is needed in these two
algorithms. For Commit, the running time on laptop for 3 voters and
12 voters is 3.52 ms and 13.03 ms, and it costs 6.699 ms and 26.963
ms on the phone. For Recover, the time consumption on laptop for 3
voters and 12 voters is 3.02 ms and 10.51 ms. The time consumption
on phone for 3 voters and 12 voters is 6.699 ms and 26.963 ms.
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Fig. 9. Simulation on Android device
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
IoT is pervasive in people’s daily life. Decision making is fun-
damental activity in the IoT. In this paper, we integrate blockchain-
based self-tallying voting systems in decentralized IoT architecture.
We solve the fairness issues in self-tallying systems with two distinct
mechanisms and provide a concrete construction. We prove the
security of the construction and also implement it to test the efficiency
of the proposed protocol.
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